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THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S SPECIAL AUTHORITY AND  
THE NORMS OF JUDICIAL POWER 
THEODORE W. RUGER†
INTRODUCTION 
This Essay explores an incongruity in the allocation and exercise 
of two different kinds of judicial discretion held by the Chief Justice of 
the United States.  The paradigmatic type of discretionary authority 
that Article III judges (including the Chief Justice) possess is ex-
pressed through the mode of adjudication, and as such is constrained 
in important ways by procedural forms that accompany that kind of 
official action.  Judges are constrained, to a greater or lesser extent, by 
formal “law,” but their discretion is additionally limited by the collec-
tive structures of the federal judiciary and also by the normative ex-
pectation that judges give express reasons for their decisions.  In this 
sense the appointment of an Article III judge can be regarded as a 
form of license to exercise bureaucratic discretion for a lifetime, but 
to do so under certain well-defined rules.  We tell judges to follow “the 
law,” to be sure, but we don’t rest our faith entirely on the law’s uncer-
tain formal constraints.  Instead, judges exercise power collectively, 
are limited to particular cases and controversies, and are obliged to 
give reasons for each important decision that they make. 
So it is for most federal judges, including the Chief Justice in his 
primary role of deciding cases on the United States Supreme Court.  
Within the Court’s core adjudicative function, the Chief’s status as 
“prima inter pares”—first among equals—is a well-known and generally 
apt description of a type of special status that is highly visible, but also 
limited in important respects.  The Chief Justice’s adjudicative power 
is structured and channeled in ways very much like the other eight 
Justices on the Court, and, in a more general sense, is much like the 
authority of any judge on a multimember appellate tribunal.  The 
Chief Justice exercises independent discretion in a formal sense when 
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he votes on cases, but is functionally dependent on the agreement of 
at least half of his peers to achieve his preferred result or rationale. 
This remains the case when he exercises the special privileges of his 
office, such as the opinion assignment power. 
The above generally describes the Chief Justice’s adjudicative role 
for the entire history of the office—even John Marshall’s prominent 
influence depended on the compliance of half or more of his col-
leagues during his long tenure.1  But in the past century, the Chief 
Justice’s basic set of powers has expanded to include sweeping author-
ity beyond the particular cases and controversies before the Court.  
Through gradual statutory and customary accretion, and spurred by 
innovative and acquisitive Chief Justices like William Howard Taft and 
William H. Rehnquist, the office has come to exercise a range of bu-
reaucratic powers that extend far beyond the Supreme Court’s walls, 
and influence the federal judiciary as a whole.  Though the Constitu-
tion confers no special powers on the office—save that of presiding at 
presidential impeachment trials2—the Chief Justice currently presides 
over the important Judicial Conference, which helps set judicial pol-
icy, appoints key managerial personnel in the federal courts, and se-
lects the judges who sit on various specialized federal courts.3  The ex-
ercise of these and other broad powers, in turn, has potential to 
meaningfully influence the substantive outcomes of at least some fed-
eral court proceedings. 
At a facial level, these two kinds of authority held by the Chief Jus-
tice appear quite different.  When discharging the office’s extramural, 
administrative duties, the Chief Justice is doing something quite dif-
ferent than the specific case resolution that is paradigmatic of an Arti-
cle III judge’s authority.  Such power is not constrained by anything 
that looks like formal “law”—such as stare decisis, textual commands, or 
the like—and we would not expect it to be, for the functional power is 
not “judicial” in nature, but is more properly thought of as “executive” 
or “bureaucratic.”  But neither is such power cabined by the other 
procedural forms that accompany and channel adjudicative discre-
tion, such as the norm of collective decision making and the expecta-
1 On Chief Justice Marshall and the Supreme Court’s decisions during his tenure, 
see generally 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, 
1789-1835 (rev. ed. 1926); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL 
CHANGE, 1815-1835 (abr. ed. 1991). 
2
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
3  For a comprehensive description of the Chief Justice’s powers and responsibili-
ties, see Peter G. Fish, The Office of Chief Justice of the United States:  Into the Federal Judici-
ary’s Bicentennial Decade, in THE OFFICE OF CHIEF JUSTICE 1 (1984). 
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tion that decisions will be justified by stated reasons.  The Chief Justice 
is empowered to exercise many of the office’s most important pow-
ers—handpicking the judges who sit on the crucial Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act (FISA) court,4 for instance—without any need 
for collegial consensus, and without any stated reasons for so doing. 
My central claim here is that this stark dichotomy in procedural 
form and normative constraint is inapt.  The seemingly different kinds 
of power that the Chief Justice exercises in his adjudicative and extra-
judicial roles are in fact quite similar in their most crucial aspect–-
both entail the application of official discretion to a discrete problem, 
with a particular set of alternative choices from which the official may 
choose.  Both, in turn, raise the problematic specter of individualistic 
discretion in the hands of a single unelected official.  To be sure, ad-
judicative discretion is constrained by formal “law” to an extent, but 
only to an extent, and judges, particularly those on the Supreme 
Court, retain significant ability to shape legal rules to choose among 
alternative results and rationales.5  But we do not expect formal law to 
do all the work when it comes to limiting judicial discretion to its basic 
form; individual judges are also constrained by a set of complemen-
tary practices—such as collective decision making and explicit reason 
giving—that, although they accompany the legal process, are not the 
same as formal “law.”  These norms are pliable enough to serve useful 
purposes in limiting official discretion in other governmental contexts 
beyond adjudication.  I argue here that these structures can be, and 
ought to be, applied to cabin the Chief Justice’s special authority in 
areas where the office’s discretion is currently unbounded. 
My Essay advances this argument in three basic parts.  Part I is a 
discussion of adjudication within Article III, with particular discussion 
of two extralegal norms—collective decision making and reason giv-
ing—that have come to accompany the exercise of legal discretion in 
4 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(a), (b), (d) (West 2003) (giving the Chief Justice the 
power to designate eleven federal district court judges to serve for seven-year terms on 
the FISA Court, which reviews and decides government applications for surveillance 
warrants). 
5 Discussing the lack of clear legal constraint on Supreme Court Justices when de-
ciding cases, Judge Richard Posner recently wrote that, in constitutional cases, the text 
and precedent is sufficiently vague that the Justices “hav[e] and exercis[e] discretion-
ary power as capacious as a legislature’s.”  See Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 
2004 Term—Foreword:  A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 40 (2005).  On the predic-
tive force of formal legal rules in Supreme Court decisions, see Theodore W. Ruger, 
Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, The Supreme Court Forecasting Pro-
ject:  Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1190-93 (2004). 
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the United States.  I explain that both norms operate as constraining 
devices to limit individual judicial discretion, in addition to, and 
somewhat independent of, formal “law” itself.  Because collectivity and 
reason giving are distinct from formal law, they are viable mechanisms 
applicable to other forms of official action outside the realm of adju-
dication.  Part II explores the development of the Chief Justice’s spe-
cial powers, and explains how the office’s authority developed without 
meaningful constraint from these presumptive Article III norms.  Part 
III concludes with a discussion of how the adjudicative norms of col-
lectivity and reason giving might be modified and applied to constrain 
various aspects of the Chief Justice’s special authority. 
I.  CONSTRAINING DISCRETION WITH COLLECTIVITY  
AND REASON GIVING 
The problem of constraining judicial discretion is a very old one, 
certainly predating the United States Constitution and evident in the 
early debates at the time of that document’s ratification.  The Framers 
made a distinction between ideal judges exercising only “judgment,” 
and more lawless jurists applying their “will.”6  Much like modern poli-
ticians, leaders of the time cast contemporaneous court decisions they 
approved of as representative of the former type, and ones they dis-
liked as products of judges’ craven political “will.”7  Central to the le-
gitimization of judging was the idea that judges based their decisions 
on, and were constrained by, a set of legal forms and practices that 
differed from the stuff of ordinary politics.  Judges themselves were 
keenly aware of this dynamic, and in the vivid language of the time 
described official discretion unburdened by legal forms as “naked”—
and thus dramatically different from the ordinary and appropriate ex-
ercise of judicial authority.8
6 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (“[The judiciary] may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely 
judgment . . . .” (emphasis in original)). 
7 See, e.g., LIBERTY SAVED, OR THE WARNINGS OF AN OLD KENTUCKIAN, TO HIS FEL-
LOW CITIZENS, ON THE DANGER OF ELECTING PARTISANS OF THE OLD COURT OF AP-
PEALS, AT THE NEXT AUGUST ELECTION, TO REPRESENT THEM IN THE NEXT GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY OF KENTUCKY 1 (Louisville, Ky., Wm. Tanner 1825) (“Had the judges the 
power of judging the laws, nothing could be law but their will . . . .”). 
8 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 51 (1849) (reasoning that certain po-
litical questions were to be assessed by “public policy alone” and represented a “mere 
naked power” inappropriate for judicial resolution); see also Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. 
(13 Pet.) 230, 236 (1839) (noting that a court, in appointing a clerk, operates outside 
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Law itself was (and is) the obvious first candidate to cover over the 
nakedness of raw judicial discretion.  In all its facets—adherence to 
text, fidelity to precedent, and embrace of deductive logic—the appli-
cation of formal law purports to channel judicial power into a deci-
sional field that, if not absolutely objective and mechanistic, is at least 
a dramatically narrowed set of plausible choices and rationales.  But 
history has shown that the strong-form argument for law’s formal con-
straint on judicial discretion is overstated.  In light of the weaker con-
straint that is revealed, it is not surprising that other customary norms 
have come to accompany the exercise of judicial authority by Article 
III courts.  The two most deeply rooted, which I will explore here, are 
the practices of collective decision making and of express reason giv-
ing.  These norms serve to channel individualistic judicial discretion 
in ways similar to legal rules, and in certain settings are probably as 
important, or more important, than “law” itself in constraining judi-
cial behavior. 
Judges, although formally independent, are intertwined with 
other judges in vertical and horizontal institutional structures, and are 
also confined in a more abstract sense by the requirement of giving 
explicit reasons for their decisions.  I will briefly discuss the develop-
ment of these adjudicative norms in the following few pages, although 
both are sufficiently entrenched and accepted that it is unnecessary to 
describe them at great length.  Crucial for the argument I make later 
in the Essay, though, is the idea that, although the norms of collectiv-
ity and reason giving have come to accompany adjudication, they are 
not uniquely or exclusively suited for that mode of governmental dis-
cretion alone.  Instead they are available procedural forms to regular-
ize other types of bureaucratic authority, including the special extra-
judicial power currently possessed by the Chief Justice. 
A.  Collectivity Within the Article III Judiciary 
The current federal judiciary is a large and complex bureaucracy, 
with some twelve hundred life-tenured judges, about thirty thousand 
employees, and a budget of over five billion dollars.9  The power of 
the federal courts is spread through various institutions and geo-
graphic locales.  Within this structure, adjudication has become a 
the bounds of legal constraint and “exercises not a judicial, but . . . a merely naked 
power”). 
9 Judith Resnik & Theodore Ruger, Op-Ed., One Robe, Two Hats, N.Y. TIMES, July 
17, 2005, at WK13. 
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quintessentially group endeavor.  Virtually every decision a federal 
judge makes is dependent in some way on the express or implicit con-
sent of other federal judges.10  Sometimes this collective function is 
vertical and hierarchical, as in the review of a decision by a higher 
court.  Sometimes it is horizontal, as in the requirement of majority 
decision making on a multimember panel or appellate court.  Federal 
circuit judges face both of these constraints—vertical and horizontal—
in each of their decisions.  To be sure, much of this potential hierar-
chical review often goes unexpressed—as when a litigant does not ap-
peal an adverse ruling—or is made more lenient through deferential 
standards of review, but the fact remains that a single federal judge 
rarely has absolutely unbounded authority on an issue before her. 
This collective dynamic impacts judicial decision making in sev-
eral ways.  Most obvious is the hierarchical dynamic of potential sub-
sequent review.  All federal judges not on the Supreme Court must tai-
lor their rulings to fit discernable circuit or Supreme Court 
precedent, or risk being overruled by a higher court.  Under the rea-
sonable presumption that lower court judges prefer not to be over-
ruled, the existence of hierarchical review provides a strong incentive 
to dampen simple preference maximization by individual judges, and 
instead creates a norm of strategic institutional compliance by judges 
situated within Article III’s hierarchy.11  One leading explanation for 
the dramatically different kind of judging that Supreme Court Justices 
do relates to the fact that their decisions are not subject to this vertical 
hierarchical dynamic. 
However, the norm of collectivity also applies internally to shape 
decision making on all of the federal appellate courts, including the 
Supreme Court.  Whether undertaken in sets of three judges, nine 
judges, or some other number for en banc panel review, federal ap-
pellate judging is a collaborative enterprise.  The corollary decision 
rule of majority consensus dramatically constrains most appellate 
judges from expressing their individual attitudinal preferences in ac-
tual case outcomes.  This operational constraint applies with particu-
lar force to judges who are preference outliers, whose own views on 
10 For examples of scholarly literature discussing the hierarchical structures of the 
federal judiciary, see Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court 
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 823-25 (1994); McNollgast, Politics and the Courts:  A 
Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1641-48 
(1995). 
11 See Caminker, supra note 10, at 824-25 (outlining the paths of appellate control 
within the Article III judiciary); McNollgast, supra note 10, at 1641-48 (providing a sta-
tistical analysis of the factors influencing lower court compliance with precedent). 
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many cases would not command a majority of their colleagues.  Such 
jurists are frequently faced with a choice of either conforming their 
views to a more moderate majority or voting in dissent without mean-
ingful impact on outcomes.  Through this dynamic, the collective 
function of appellate adjudication serves a moderating function, 
thwarting the expression of extreme views and forcing outcome-
determinative voting toward an ideological center. 
This collective dynamic produces other normatively desirable ef-
fects that go beyond a general preference moderation.  Group voting 
is usually accompanied by group deliberation, and the deliberation 
that takes place on appellate tribunals may result in judicial outcomes 
that are better informed, better thought out, and better justified than 
would occur in an individualized setting.  In stark contrast to many of 
the Chief Justice’s administrative powers, appellate judges deciding 
cases must talk with each other, test and debate their initial inclina-
tions, and ultimately reach majority consensus on the result of a case. 
I pause here to make an important qualification:  I do not claim 
that the collectivity described here is intrinsic to judging itself in an 
acontextual or platonic sense.  It is possible to imagine a conception 
of judging that does not make this collective norm as central as it is to 
the current Article III judiciary.  Indeed, for the early part of United 
States history, federal judges were dramatically more disparate, both 
geographically and decisionally, than they are now.  Nothing in the 
text of Article III itself—which speaks only of “one supreme Court” 
and “such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time or-
dain and establish”12—demands the particular interconnectedness 
that has come to characterize the modern federal judiciary.  Even the 
notion of appellate jurisdiction does not inherently require adoption 
of the current practice of blending preferences through appeals to 
different sets of judges.13  The earliest federal appellate practice often 
entailed the original decision maker (the district judge) sitting and 
hearing the same matter a second time as a part of the circuit court.14  
Other practices further indicate that the norm of collective majority 
consensus was less important in the early United States.  For instance, 
some leading Marshall Court opinions were, because of illness or geo-
12 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
13 See Caminker, supra note 10, at 826-28 (indicating that an appellate structure is 
still possible with completely autonomous courts). 
14 Ellen E. Seward, The Seventh Amendment and the Alchemy of Fact and Law, 33 
SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 586 n.80 (2003). 
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graphic absence of some Justices, issued by a minority of the entire 
Supreme Court.15
To describe such historical anomalies, however, serves primarily to 
underscore how deeply the norm of collectivity is entrenched in the 
current federal judiciary.  Though district judges occasionally do sit by 
designation on circuit courts today, a district judge hearing and opin-
ing on an appeal from her own trial ruling would today be regarded as 
highly inappropriate.  The Marshall Court’s occasional practice of is-
suing key constitutional rulings by submajority was assailed even in its 
day,16 and the Court reformed the practice soon thereafter.17  In mod-
ern Supreme Court practice, the Justices are empowered to issue rul-
ings endorsed by fewer than five votes, but such plurality or submajor-
ity outcomes typically carry diminished precedential force.  In sum, as 
the federal judiciary has grown in size and scope over the past two 
centuries, it has become more collective and interconnected in its de-
cisional norms. 
An important adjunct to the norm of collectivity in current Article 
III practice is the idea of random or automatic systems for case selec-
tion and panel assignment.18  I have said that the federal judiciary is a 
collective institution, but it does not make decisions in a single collec-
tive body as a legislature would.  Judicial authority is applied in the 
first instance by particular district judges sitting individually, or par-
ticular sets of three appellate judges.  But even here the collectivity 
norm applies derivatively in the practices of random and rotating case 
and panel assignments.  Random assignment or panel selection across 
a group of heterogeneous judges is a sort of probabilistic aggregation 
of the collective judiciary’s preferences—litigants will get a particular 
judge, or group of judges, who may differ from others, but ex ante the 
probability pool stretches across a larger group.  To be sure, individ-
ual variation among judges can, once the case or panel assignment is 
made, produce substantial disparity in outcomes of actual cases.  But 
this is an after-the-fact manifestation of individual judicial differences, 
15 See Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court:  A History of Judicial 
Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 193 n.41 (1959). 
16 See id. at 194 (“An opinion is huddled up in conclave, perhaps by a majority of 
one, delivered as if unanimous, and with the silent acquiesence of lazy or timid associ-
ates, by a crafty chief judge . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Thomas 
Jefferson)). 
17 Id. at 195. 
18 For a discussion of current assignment practices generally, see J. Robert Brown, 
Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. 
REV. 1037, 1069-78 (2000). 
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and in any event is subject to aggregate review (by appellate courts or 
en banc panels) that often smooths out such variation. 
B.  The Normative Constraint of Reason Giving 
Federal judges exercise their discretion in collective structures; 
they also typically give express reasons for the decisions that they 
make.  The practice is so well established that the discussion here can 
be brief, and I seek to make two related points.  First, the requirement 
of giving reasons is an important component of the judicial process, 
and one that exerts at least some constraint on the individual discre-
tion of judges.  Second, although the “giving reasons” requirement is 
intimately connected with “law” in our legal system, it is not exclu-
sively part of the adjudicative function, and is capable of channeling 
and regularizing official behavior by judges and others in different 
decisional settings.  As such, it is a device fit for consideration as a po-
tential “export” to other fields of individualistic official discretion, 
such as much of the Chief Justice’s special authority. 
Many legal scholars, perhaps most notably Frederick Schauer, 
have explored the theory and practice of reason giving, and the man-
ner in which it impacts judging,19 and I do not intend to offer a full 
and fresh exploration of that topic here.  In general, this literature 
explores the manner in which giving reasons serves to channel and 
constrain judicial discretion in the future.  As Schauer explains, there 
is something fundamental about legal reasoning that makes the ex-
pression of such reasons at least a weak constraint on judges in future 
cases.  The norms of judging demand a reason that is broader than 
the particular case at hand20—one cannot decide a case in favor of 
John Doe on the unique ground that “I think John Doe should prevail 
here.”  Some reasons of greater breadth must be given, and the 
greater breadth will sweep in at least some future cases which will pre-
sumptively be decided in like fashion.  By considering this universe of 
potential future cases at the time of the original decision, judges will 
discard at least some rationales for ruling in John Doe’s favor, on the 
thinking that other less desirable future outcomes might be com-
pelled—or at least presumptively suggested—by such a rule.  To be 
19 See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 656-59 (1995) (dis-
cussing the advantages and disadvantages of institutions that require decision makers 
to give reasons). 
20 See id. at 638-43 (“[R]easons are typically propositions of greater generality than 
the conclusions they are reasons for . . . .”). 
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sure, there is no blunt enforcement mechanism against life-tenured 
judges who are inconsistent in their rulings, but reputational and col-
legiality concerns held by many judges render the reason-giving norm 
at least a partial constraint on raw discretion. 
These basic points explain much of the criticism of judicial deci-
sions that are not grounded in reasons that are at least somewhat 
broader than the particular matter at hand.  The Supreme Court’s 
Bush v. Gore decision is problematic not just because it was doctrinally 
defective in its basic rationale, but also because the plurality opinion 
sought to confine its reasoning to one, and only one, case.21  Similarly, 
a major concern about various circuit courts’ “no-citation” rules for 
unpublished opinions22 goes to the potential change in judicial behav-
ior arising from the freedom to decide cases without giving durable 
reasons.23  The concern is not primarily about subsequent litigants 
who are unable to benefit from potentially useful authority, but about 
the original litigant, whose case is decided by judges applying reasons 
they know will not resonate beyond the case at hand.  As such, the 
judges are doing something different than ordinary appellate judging, 
and are arguably less constrained because their “unpublished” reasons 
are transitory.  The common theme of both of these examples is a 
concern that the judges who don’t give express reasons are free to ex-
ercise more free-ranging discretion in particular cases, because the 
stakes are lowered through time—the original decision does not de-
cide future cases.  With that temporal cheapening comes a type of de-
cision making that is more disposable, and thus perhaps more subject 
to individualistic whim or preference. 
C.  Beyond Adjudication 
Because reason giving is an integral part of the formal adjudicative 
process in a system grounded in part on stare decisis principles, it is 
possible to equate reason giving with law giving itself.  But, although 
the two processes overlap, they are not identical, and the act of giving 
21 See 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (noting that the Court’s equal protection holding “is 
limited to the present circumstances”). 
22 The Supreme Court has issued a rule which, unless Congress intervenes, will 
invalidate “no-citation” rules as they apply to unpublished opinions issued on or after 
January 1, 2007.  Tony Mauro, Court Endorses Use of Unpublished Opinions, LEGAL TIMES, 
Apr. 17, 2006, at 15. 
23 See, e.g., Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions:  A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 219, 221 (1999) (noting critically that judges “are perfectly free to depart 
from past opinions if they are unpublished”). 
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reasons has independent force in constraining official discretion that 
does not depend on the context of adjudication.  As Martin Shapiro 
has explained with respect to administrative action, the act of giving 
reasons has potential to constrain the discretion of bureaucratic offi-
cials in various and subtle ways.24  Shapiro characterizes giving-reasons 
requirements as “a form of internal improvement for administrators,” 
which create a “mild self-enforcing mechanism for controlling discre-
tion.”25  Decisions coupled with express reasons are likely to be better 
thought out, more sensitive to opposing views, and more “reasonable” 
than they otherwise might be. 
This insight that a giving-reasons requirement improves bureau-
cratic decision making forms an important part of the administrative 
law infrastructure in the United States.  In general, agency action is 
considered more persuasive—and thus more entitled to deference 
from other institutional actors—if it is accompanied by a well-argued 
statement of reasons.26  This idea is formally codified in the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act’s process of notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
which mandates specific explanation of a proposed change, followed 
by comments, followed by more written explanation and response.27  
Though less pervasive within the executive branch, collective decision-
making structures are also occasionally used as a means for control-
ling individualistic official discretion.  For example, many of the agen-
cies where “independence” from political officials is deemed most im-
portant (like the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal 
Communications Commission) make key decisions by a vote of a mul-
timember commission much like an appellate judicial tribunal.28  My 
aim here is not to describe these bureaucratic devices in detail, but 
simply to underscore that they are applied, with potentially desirable 
effects, in a range of areas beyond traditional adjudication.  That the 
24 Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 180-
81. 
25 Id. 
26 See, e.g., California Hotel & Motel Ass’n v. Industrial Welfare Comm’n, 599 P.2d 
31, 37 (Cal. 1979) (“[R]equiring an administrative agency to articulate publicly its rea-
sons for adopting a particular order, rule, regulation, or policy induces agency action 
that is reasonable, rather than arbitrary, capricious, or lacking in evidentiary sup-
port.”).  
27 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556-557 (2000). 
28 See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 4.14(c) (2005) (“Any [Federal Trade] Commission action, 
either at a meeting or by written circulation, may be taken only with the affirmative 
concurrence of a majority of the participating Commissioners . . . .”); 47 C.F.R. § 
0.201(d) (2005) (“The Commission, by vote of a majority of the members then hold-
ing office, may delegate its functions either by rule or by order . . . .”). 
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Chief Justice’s special powers are not “adjudicative” in nature need 
not ipso facto render them off limits to the application of collectiviza-
tion and reason giving. 
II.  THE RISE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S UNITARY AUTHORITY 
My contention throughout this Essay is that two fundamental 
norms that accompany adjudication can, and should, be extended to 
circumscribe several of the bureaucratic functions currently exercised 
by the Chief Justice.  I will explore several specific proposals for doing 
so in a later section.  However, the fact that so much of the Chief Jus-
tice’s current power is so individualized and unconstrained compels a 
brief summary of the rise of this authority.  What emerges from this 
history is a story of an office carefully and strategically constructed in 
the early twentieth century—and fortified thereafter–-under a particu-
lar conception of individualized executive administration that is both 
outdated and ill-advised. 
Few clues, much less commands, about the appropriate scope of 
the Chief Justice’s powers are provided by the Constitution itself.  
Probably no major constitutional office is as textually unspecified.  
The position of Chief Justice appears nowhere in the Constitution’s 
Article III, and only once in the entire document–-in the part of Arti-
cle I providing for presidential impeachments with the Chief Justice 
presiding.29  Nor was there significant discussion of the role of the 
Chief Justice at the convention or in ratification debates.  We know 
that the Framers contemplated a Supreme Court with a Chief Justice, 
but very little other content is present in the relevant discussions.30  
And for more than a century after the establishment of the office, the 
Chief Justice had very little power over the organization or operation 
of the broader federal judiciary—federal district courts were generally 
independent not just from the other branches of government but also 
from each other.31  Writing in the early twentieth century, Felix Frank-
furter and James Landis summarized the history by declaring that 
“neither Congress nor the profession thought much about [the] ele-
29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
30 For a general discussion of the Framers’ debates about the Appointments 
Clause, but not specifically the Chief Justice, see MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 15-44 (2000). 
31 FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT:  
A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 218 (1928). 
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ments of organization and administration” of the federal judicial sys-
tem.32
This would change during the era of World War I, and the driving 
force behind many of the changes in federal judicial organization was 
William Howard Taft.  Whether in or out of public office, Taft 
throughout his career was a tireless judicial reformer–-he characteris-
tically proclaimed that he “love[d] judges” and “love[d] courts.”33  
Much of his reformist zeal was in response to Progressive attacks on 
the judiciary, and he sought to defend the central role of the federal 
courts by “provid[ing] them with adequate machinery for the prompt 
and satisfactory dispatch of business.”34  Taft envisioned the federal 
courts as an integrated bureaucracy, and proposed a series of meas-
ures to promote such structural cohesion.  By connecting and corpo-
ratizing what had previously been a disparate set of largely independ-
ent decisional nodes, Taft helped to create a new federal court system 
that “ran counter to all the traditional conceptions of American judi-
cial organization.”35
Taft envisioned a newly integrated and hierarchical federal judici-
ary, but it was his conception of the head of that structure that is most 
relevant here.  Central to Taft’s idea of structural integration and re-
form in the judiciary was the implementation of what he called the 
“executive principle”—the idea that a single head would direct the 
operations of the federal courts.36  Taft sought to transfer to the fed-
eral judiciary the “ordinary business principles in successful executive 
work, of a head charged with the responsibility of the use of the judi-
cial force at places and under conditions where the judicial force is 
needed.”37  This new unitary executive power was, in Taft’s view, to be 
embodied in the person of the Chief Justice. 
Much of the Chief Justice’s current discretionary authority is 
traceable to this crucial choice made by Taft and like-minded reform-
32 Id. at 217. 
33 Daniel S. McHargue, President Taft’s Appointments to the Supreme Court, 12 J. POL. 
478, 478 (1950).  Taft followed this expression by saying that courts and judges were 
his “ideals on earth of what we shall meet afterward in Heaven under a just God.”  Id. 
34 William H. Taft, Chief Justice of the United States, Adequate Machinery for Ju-
dicial Business, Address to the Judicial Section of the American Bar Association (Aug. 
30, 1921), in 7 A.B.A. J. 453, 453 (1921). 
35 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 31, at 219. 
36 ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT:  CHIEF JUSTICE 99-100 
(1964). 
37 William H. Taft, The Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure, 5 KY. L.J., 3, 16 
(1916). 
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ers of the era:  to centralize this “executive principle” in a single of-
fice—the Chief Justice—rather than to diffuse it more broadly among 
a collective of federal judges.  It is perhaps unsurprising that Taft re-
garded this individualized executive authority as the most efficient 
and effective mechanism, given his own service as President.  It is also 
clear that his reforms were heavily influenced by other contempora-
neous examples of unitary executive power.  He admired “business 
principles” of organization, which at the time contemplated a hierar-
chical structure headed by a strong chief executive officer.38  Taft’s vi-
sion of federal judicial reform was also influenced by two comparative 
examples with a more robust chief executive pedigree—the British 
system with its powerful Lord Chancellor, and the Chicago Municipal 
Court, whose chief judge had extensive administrative authority to al-
locate judges and assign cases.39
This individualistic conception of executive power in the judiciary 
was implemented in specific statutes during the early twentieth cen-
tury.  For instance, in 1910 when Taft and fellow reformers proposed 
a new specialized Commerce Court (to review decisions of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission), they chose to grant the Chief Justice 
alone the power to select the federal judges who would serve tempo-
rary terms on that tribunal.40  In a different proposal infused with the 
new individualistic executive principle, Taft sought the appointment 
of a number of federal district judges “at large,” who would hold no 
fixed geographic seats but would be sent throughout the country to 
hear cases at the sole direction of the Chief Justice.41  The potential 
impropriety of such novel powers centralized in the Chief Justice’s 
person was not lost on several vocal critics in Congress, who vigorously 
opposed both measures on grounds of undue centralization.  Speak-
ing against the Chief Justice’s individual authority to select Commerce 
Court judges, Senator LaFollette assessed the discretion to pick special 
court judges as “too important a matter to leave . . . to one man, the 
Chief Justice.”42  Senator Shields was more strident in his critique of 
the “at-large judges” bill, claiming it would cast “the Chief Justice as 
38 Id. 
39 See id. at 14, 17. 
40 See Commerce Court (Mann-Elkins) Act of 1910, ch. 309 § 1, 36 Stat. 539, 539-
42; see also George E. Dix, The Death of the Commerce Court:  A Study in Institutional Weak-
ness, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 238, 239 (1964) (describing the creation and subsequent dis-
solution of the Commerce Court). 
41 See Taft, supra note 37, at 16 -17 (discussing the benefits of the ability to redeploy 
federal judges to meet shifting regional needs). 
42 45 CONG. REC. 7347 (1910). 
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commander in chief” and grant the office “political influence and 
power over the judiciary of which a designing man could avail him-
self.”43
Though the “at-large judges” bill was defeated, Congress did pass 
several other statutes that form the template for the modern powers of 
the Chief Justice’s office.44  Opposition voices, like LaFollette’s, which 
proposed constraining the Chief Justice by collectivizing the selection 
authority in the entire Supreme Court, never attained a majority posi-
tion.  The structural preference, driven by Taft’s conception of a 
strong, efficient chief executive, was to centralize administrative au-
thority in the Chief Justice alone.  This choice, made by earlier Con-
gresses and repeated by others, forms the basis of much of the author-
ity currently held by the Chief Justice. 
As I have explained above, I share the belief of the earliest con-
gressional critics that such centralization is a fundamentally misguided 
choice, and one not required by the administrative functions that the 
Chief Justice was given to perform.  Though “executive” in nature, 
most of the administrative activities that the Chief undertakes—
selecting special court judges, picking individuals for the committees 
of the Judicial Conference, and proposing policy changes—do not re-
quire the kind of immediate, decisive, and unitary action that would 
argue for individualized executive authority in other contexts, the 
most obvious of which is the presidency.  The next section explores 
some alternative structures that would pragmatically discharge these 
functions while avoiding the potential for abuse of discretion that in-
heres when this authority is given to the Chief Justice alone. 
What is notable in the history are two other mistakes that have 
served to compound the original fallacy of individualistic executive 
power as applied to the judiciary.  The first is a mistaken assumption 
that was used to justify the original choice to vest power individually in 
the Chief Justice.  Proponents of strong unitary authority in the Chief 
Justice maintained that something unique in the officeholder’s char-
acter would render the post a safe repository of individualistic and un-
constrained power.  Defending the Chief Justice’s individual authority 
to appoint Commerce Court judges, Senator Carter rebuffed concerns 
by replying that 
43 62 CONG. REC. 4855, 4863 (1922). 
44 See Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 341, 359-67 (2004) [hereinafter Ruger, Judicial Appointment Power] (listing 
such examples throughout the twentieth century). 
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John Jay, John Marshall, and all the great departed Chief Justices of the 
Supreme Court of the United States might well turn in their graves in 
contemplation of this the first reflection proposed to be cast in the legis-
lative halls of the United States upon the Chief Justices of this and suc-
ceeding times.
45
Senator Hale from Maine opposed LaFollette’s collectivizing re-
forms because he “hope[d] and believe[d] that no amendment that 
in any way raises any possible question about the supreme fitness of 
the Chief Justice of the United States to administer this law as it now is 
will receive the approval and sanction of the Senate.”46
Such justificatory accounts are prevalent even today.  Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist, who exercised the broad powers of the chief jus-
ticeship as vigorously as any officeholder in history, was widely ac-
claimed for his fair and evenhanded administrative style.  His re-
placement, John Roberts, was confirmed by a large margin after he 
disclaimed any ideological agenda and agreed to enforce legal rules as 
a baseball umpire would.47  Taken together, the effect of this senti-
ment then and now is to blunt the ordinary concern about the grant 
of so much undivided power to one individual. 
Whether or not this sanguine assessment of Chief Justices’ behav-
ior is historically accurate is a debatable question.  In other work, I 
have attempted empirically to assess the temporary appointment 
choices of the most recent Chief Justices, and a mixed picture 
emerges.48  On the one hand, both William Rehnquist and Warren 
Burger selected judges appointed by Presidents from both parties who 
reflected a reasonable measure of ideological diversity.49  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s choices for the FISA Court over almost two decades corre-
sponded very closely with a random set of federal judges produced 
from the same relevant background pool.50  On the other hand, there 
is evidence that both Rehnquist and Burger stocked the most impor-
45 45 CONG. REC. 7348 (1910). 
46 Id. at 7349. 
47 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice 
of the United States:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) 
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States) 
(“Judges are like umpires.  Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them.”). 
48 Ruger, Judicial Appointment Power, supra note 44, at 390-402; Theodore W. Ruger, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Appointments to the FISA Court:  An Empirical Perspective, 100 NW. 
U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter Ruger, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Appoint-
ments]. 
49 See Ruger, Judicial Appointment Power, supra note 44, at 393; Ruger, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s Appointments, supra note 48, at 31-32. 
50 Ruger, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Appointments, supra note 48, at 23. 
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tant special tribunals, such as the Special Division of the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit that chooses independent counsels, with conservative 
Republican appointees.51
From the point of view of constitutional structure, however, all of 
this empirical investigation and speculation is largely beside the point.  
The Constitution allocates power in accord with the Madisonian pre-
sumption that it is subject to abuse (e.g., The Federalist No. 51), and 
rarely gives pockets of absolutely unreviewable authority to any one 
officeholder, particularly outside the executive branch.  Against this 
baseline assumption, the Chief’s individualistic authority is particu-
larly incongruous, and the historical and current defenses of such 
power that are grounded in characterological assumptions against 
abuse are particularly misguided. 
The two original mistakes described here—a preference for indi-
vidualistic concentration of power and a character-driven presump-
tion against its abuse—have been compounded during the course of 
the past century by a curious path dependence on the part of Con-
gress.  Once proponents of a strong Chief Justice as chief executive 
won the earliest congressional debates in the Taft era, subsequent 
Congresses extended and perpetuated this unitary executive model 
without significant debate, culminating in the current array of discre-
tionary authority held by the Chief.  Throughout the later twentieth 
century, Congress employed the model of individual Chief Justice 
power—in appointing judges, staffing Judicial Conference commit-
tees, and hiring key administrative personnel—without meaningfully 
questioning the potential problems with such undivided authority.52  
But such a concentrated executive model is not the only option avail-
able, and I now turn to alternative structures that would better serve 
to constrain the Chief Justice’s power while still permitting the worka-
ble exercise of the office’s administrative functions. 
III.  ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES AND POTENTIAL REFORMS 
My central claim in this Essay is that the vesting of too much indi-
vidualistic authority in the Chief Justice is inappropriate because the 
power is unconstrained by many of the central features of judicial de-
cision making that are normally associated with the exercise of Article 
III authority.  Though we would expect the Chief Justice’s administra-
tive discretion to be unconstrained by “law”—for these are not “legal” 
51 See Ruger, Judicial Appointment Power, supra note 44, at 393-94. 
52 See id., at 358-59, 366-67. 
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decisions in any normal sense of that word—the Chief Justice’s power 
is also unconstrained by norms of collective decision making and rea-
son giving.  These structures could, in most cases, easily be trans-
ported and implemented to channel the exercise of judicial adminis-
trative authority.  In this section, I will address the manner in which 
several of the most important functions currently exercised solely by 
the Chief Justice could be reconfigured to take advantage of these 
other structural devices. 
To examine how some of the Chief Justice’s nonadjudicative roles 
might be reformed, it is useful to first classify the office’s tasks into 
several general types.  A first class of functions arises from the Chief 
Justice’s special managerial role within the Supreme Court itself.  The 
Chief makes opinion assignments when in the majority, organizes the 
conference of Justices, presides at oral argument, and makes numer-
ous decisions that bear on the day-to-day functions of the Court.  My 
project here is largely unconcerned with these internal powers, al-
though for a reason that only underscores my general critique of the 
Chief Justice’s external authority.  Despite the Chief Justice’s unques-
tioned leading role within the Supreme Court itself, almost every fea-
ture of the office’s internal managerial power is ultimately exercised 
under a consensual norm that is at least potentially subject to majority 
override from five of the Associate Justices.  So, for instance, opinion 
assignment falls to the Chief Justice only when she is in the majority.  
The allocation of Justices to various circuits (which can be important 
for death penalty appeals and other emergency stays), although or-
ganized by the Chief Justice, is a duty given by statute to the Court as a 
whole.53  The same dynamic would apply to key changes in oral argu-
ment procedure, such as the introduction of television cameras into 
the Supreme Court chamber.  The Chief Justice’s special role within 
the Court is no doubt important, but it is less problematic precisely 
because of the general structural constraint.  Indeed, the fact that 
even the Chief Justice’s leadership authority within the Court is for-
mally constrained within a collective structure only underscores the 
incongruity of the several individualistic powers the Chief exercises 
over the broader judiciary. 
These broader powers outside of the Supreme Court can also be 
classified, and only certain types present meaningful problems.  The 
Chief Justice has a number of roles that are almost purely ceremo-
53 See 28 U.S.C. § 42 (2000) (“The Chief Justice of the United States and the asso-
ciate justices of the Supreme Court shall from time to time be allotted as circuit jus-
tices among the circuits by order of the Supreme Court.”). 
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nial—such as swearing in the President and serving on the Board of 
the Smithsonian Institution.54  These functions do not implicate sub-
stantive policy choices and so are not fit for inclusion in any reform 
proposal.  The Chief Justice’s central role in presidential impeach-
ment trials might occasionally involve the meaningful exercise of offi-
cial discretion, but such events are exceedingly rare and, in any event, 
the presiding role is textually committed by the Constitution to the 
Chief Justice alone.55
What remains are two general types of power.  Both are meaning-
ful exercises of official discretion, with possible relevance for the or-
ganization and operation of federal courts, and occasionally for the 
outcomes of particular cases and rulemaking procedures.  One gen-
eral kind of power the Chief Justice holds is appointive:  the Chief Jus-
tice selects the members of various committees of the Federal Judicial 
Conference, which in turn make key judicial policy proposals.56  Addi-
tionally, the Chief Justice selects the federal judges who will serve lim-
ited terms on several important specialized tribunals, which in turn 
make key decisions on subjects such as government surveillance, large-
scale litigation, and the investigation of the President’s conduct.57  
This appointive power is indirect, in that the Chief Justice does not di-
rectly make first-order policy or legal decisions.  But because the Chief 
Justice usually knows the subjects that his appointees will address, he 
can skew the substantive outcomes of the committees and tribunals 
thus formed by strategic appointment decisions.  This potential for 
abuse makes this appointive discretion a proper subject for constraint 
within the general norms of judicial decision making.  Moreover, 
these appointive choices are not the kinds of executive decisions that 
demand unitary treatment for reasons of expediency—witness the fact 
that the Constitution divides the initial appointment of federal judges 
and other officers between the President and Senate.58
54 20 U.S.C. § 41 (2000). 
55 U.S. CONST. art. I., § 3, cl. 6. 
56 See Fish, supra note 2, at 104-06 (describing the Chief Justice’s responsibilities as 
the head of the Judicial Conference); Peter Graham Fish, Crisis, Politics and Federal Judi-
cial Reform:  The Administrative Office Act of 1939, 32 J. POL. 599, 621 (1970) (explaining 
the growth of the Judicial Conference’s influence); Judith Resnik, The Programmatic 
Judiciary:  Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 269, 283-93 (2000) (describing the mechanics of policy making through the Judi-
cial Conference). 
57 See Ruger, Judicial Appointment Power, supra note 44, at 359-67. 
58 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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With this in mind, the most obvious application of the back-
ground norms of judicial discretion to this problem would be to col-
lectivize decision making among a broader group of judges.  Such col-
lective administrative mechanisms have competed historically with the 
Taftian vision of centralization in the judiciary, often in the form of 
rejected counterproposals but very occasionally as actual policy de-
vices.  Early opponents of the Chief Justice’s Commerce Court selec-
tion authority proposed vesting the selection of judges in the Supreme 
Court as a whole.59  One unenacted version of the bill that became the 
Ethics in Government Act contemplated that the District of Columbia 
federal district judges together, not the Chief Justice alone, would se-
lect a panel of judges, who in turn would select and oversee inde-
pendent counsels.60  Underlying these proposed mechanisms is the 
concern expressed here—that the selection of special judges entails a 
discretionary policy choice that is inappropriately vested in a single of-
ficial. 
Other collective decisional structures have occasionally appeared 
in enacted law.  The United States Sentencing Commission contains 
some members who are active Article III judges chosen by the Presi-
dent, but the President chooses from a short list of judges who are 
originally selected by the entire Judicial Conference, not by the Chief 
Justice alone.61  Likewise, Congress established one historical special 
judicial tribunal—the Railroad Reorganization Court—that was com-
prised of active judges chosen by the Multidistrict Litigation Panel.62  
That this collective body chose Henry Friendly to lead that court is 
suggestive—if in a highly anecdotal sense—of the quality of judges po-
tentially selected through such collective mechanisms.63
It is possible, indeed probable, that in such collective structures 
the Chief Justice would nonetheless take a leading role—just as he 
does within the Court in what are formally group decisions—in re-
59 See 45 CONG. REC. 7347 (1910) (statement of Sen. LaFollette) (arguing that des-
ignation of Commerce Court judges “should be made by the entire membership of the 
Supreme Court instead of by a single member of that body”). 
60 See Ken Gormley, An Original Model of the Independent Counsel Statute, 97 MICH. L. 
REV. 601, 609 & n.26 (1998) (describing Senator Birch Bayh Jr.’s proposal). 
61 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2000); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 
(1989) (upholding the structure and appointment procedures of the Sentencing 
Commission). 
62 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 
426. 
63 See Henry T. Greely, Quantitative Analysis of a Judicial Career:  A Case Study of Judge 
John Minor Wisdom, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 99, 115 n.63 (1996). 
    
2006] THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S SPECIAL AUTHORITY 1571 
 
cruiting candidates and perhaps making initial choices for approval or 
disapproval.  But the looming prospect of override would remain, thus 
providing a constraint on the Chief Justice’s strategic behavior that 
does not presently exist.  To the extent that such an appointive choice 
had import, if the Chief strayed dramatically from the preferences of 
the rest of the judges involved, it is probable that dissenting judges 
would make their views known either through internal discourse or 
formal objection. 
The installation of such group decision making would undoubt-
edly add time and some administrative burden to the process of select-
ing special court judges and Judicial Conference committee members 
beyond what exists in the current unilateral system.  But these effi-
ciency losses seem to be a marginal cost for appointments that only 
occur occasionally and almost always predictably at fixed times.  A dif-
ferent concern is that disagreement might emerge with respect to par-
ticular appointments, which in turn might undermine the legitimacy 
or perceived objectivity of the resultant official action by the appoint-
ees.  This is, in a sense, a microcosm of the debates about judicial 
power generally—some assert that too much scrutiny of judges’ un-
derlying preferences risks undermining the legitimacy of the judicial 
enterprise.  But after a century or more of strongly expressed legal re-
alism in the legal academy and overt dissensus on the Supreme Court, 
the courts are still highly regarded institutions relative to other parts 
of the federal government.64  Moreover, in this administrative context, 
collectivity and transparency can be viewed as independent vari-
ables—the choices could be collectivized but essentially private—and 
overt dissent need not be publicized, as it is in the context of judicial 
opinions. 
If concerns about collective decision making remain, an alterna-
tive solution would be to remove all allocative discretion, while still 
drawing on the collective body of the federal judiciary, by making 
temporary service on the Judicial Conference committees and special 
courts automatic, or random, or both.  The chief judges of the twelve 
federal circuits are selected in this manner—a statutory seniority pro-
vision triggered by both age and length of service operates to auto-
matically select new circuit chief judges when a vacancy arises.65  Ap-
plied to the special federal courts and Judicial Conference 
64 See James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 
2000:  Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535 (2003). 
65 28 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000). 
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committees, judges with a particular level of service tenure would be 
automatically eligible for random assignment to one of the specialized 
courts or committees.  Complete randomness might be problematic 
due to the inability to take advantage of particularized substantive ex-
pertise, and if so a hybrid system might apply so that some specialized 
judicial service was automatically triggered.  However, which forum a 
particular judge would serve in would be determined by the Supreme 
Court, or the Judicial Conference judge, or some other group deci-
sion maker. 
It is perhaps less obvious how the other decisional norm I discuss 
above—the practice of reason giving—might be adapted to the Chief 
Justice’s formation of Judicial Conference committees and specialized 
tribunals.  Under current law and customary practice, the Chief Jus-
tice currently gives no public reasons for most of his bureaucratic ac-
tions.  A statutory reform that would require a statement of reasons 
for every single judge assigned may create more problems than it 
solves.  Such a rule might have a salutary impact on the provision of 
information, but if presidential nomination statements are any guide, 
the reasons the Chief Justice would give with respect to individual 
candidates would probably be so platitudinous as to be unhelpful and 
obfuscatory.  More desirable would be a requirement or customary 
practice whereby the Chief Justice would publicly issue a written gen-
eral framework for the exercise of his appointment authority over the 
Judicial Conference committees and specialized courts.  Such a gen-
eral plan could be assessed and revised, perhaps coupled with an op-
portunity for comment from the public and particular groups.  The 
Chief Justice could articulate general characteristics, such as seniority 
of service or particularized experience, that would qualify judges for 
consideration for various special tasks. 
Though not tightly binding, such general guidelines could oper-
ate to produce a mild form of “internal improvement” in the Chief 
Justice’s choices, perhaps promoting a degree of consistency and 
regularity over time in a manner that is absent under current practice.  
Moreover, the appointment framework that the Chief Justice would 
promulgate would have a discursive effect, promoting critique and 
debate, and leading to the possibility of changed practices or revisions 
from the Chief Justice or future Chief Justices. 
For instance, the Special Division of the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit that was empowered to choose independent counsels sat for 
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twenty-two years, from 1978 through 2000.66  In that period, Chief Jus-
tices Burger and Rehnquist appointed eleven circuit judges to that 
tribunal, seven appointed by Republican Presidents and four by De-
mocrats.  More striking though is the ongoing composition of the 
panel:  for over twenty of the twenty-two years, the special division was 
comprised of two Republican appointees and one Democrat ap-
pointee.67  Such regularity suggests strategic behavior by Burger and 
Rehnquist, but they were not required to give reasons for their choices 
and they did not do so.  Had they been under a reason-giving obliga-
tion they no doubt would not have cast their appointment criteria in 
the partisan terms I do here, but they would have had to articulate 
some general principle.  This in turn might have cabined their discre-
tion somewhat and led to appointment choices made with more scru-
tiny and rationale.  Such transparency would also serve a monitoring 
function, and the public and the legal academy could assess the Chief 
Justice’s specific appointment choices and measure them.  Perhaps a 
more explicit monitoring would also occur—assessing the Chief Jus-
tice’s choices for ideological balance and other factors.  Observers of 
the judiciary could evaluate the Chief Justice’s actual appointments 
over time for congruity with these stated goals. 
CONCLUSION 
As these disparate policy proposals suggest, I am more concerned 
about the problem I have described than about the particular shape 
of the solution.  Significant aspects of the Chief Justice’s discretionary 
authority are currently unconstrained by any collective structure or 
reason-giving obligation, and so almost any effort to channel or regu-
larize that discretion would work an improvement on the current sys-
tem.  Because they have been proposed and debated, and in some in-
stances successfully applied, reforms that would spread the discretion 
currently held solely by the Chief Justice among a larger group of 
judges—the Supreme Court or the Judicial Conference, for in-
stance—are a more obviously salutary fix.  Application of the reason-
giving norm to these powers is more complicated and uncertain, 
though potentially beneficial enough to warrant further discussion. 
Irrespective of the particular shape of any reformative change, 
several institutional actors are situated to bring about reform.  Con-
66 See John Q. Barrett, Special Division Agonistes, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 17, 44-47 
(2000). 
67 See id. 
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gress is responsible for much of the special authority possessed by the 
Chief Justice.  To a great extent Congress made the modern chief jus-
ticeship by statute during the twentieth century, and could similarly 
unmake, or at least dramatically modify, the particular statutory pow-
ers the office possesses over the federal judicial bureaucracy, which I 
have discussed here.  Doing so would require Congress to depart from 
its unthinking path dependence, and its generally sanguine view of 
the Chief Justice’s behavior, which it has displayed throughout the 
twentieth century since the Taft era.  I am pessimistic about reform 
emanating from this quarter, as the Senate Judiciary Committee de-
clined a rare opportunity to expressly discuss many of the issues ex-
plored here with the new Chief Justice nominee, John Roberts, during 
the confirmation hearings last summer. 
Even absent statutory change, however, it is possible that Chief 
Justice Roberts or some successor could achieve some reform by 
changing the customary manner in which the powers are exercised.  A 
Chief Justice could seek assent from Supreme Court colleagues even 
where not statutorily required.  The Chief Justice could make a prac-
tice of publicly expressing the general criteria that would guide vari-
ous features of her authority, and could transparently report the pol-
icy choices as she made them.  Pressure for reform could also emanate 
from the broader federal judiciary, although so long as the chief jus-
ticeship is occupied by an individual whose leadership is broadly re-
spected, as was William Rehnquist’s, structural change is unlikely to 
occur. 
Ultimately, however, we are left with an allocation of power that is 
conceptually problematic but unlikely to be corrected in the foresee-
able future.  There are, to be sure, more dramatic and more impor-
tant controversies raging about the proper division of authority 
among various actors in the federal government.  Underlying these 
larger debates, however, is a principle that is central to this essay’s cri-
tique of the Chief Justice’s power:  the idea that too much power con-
centrated with a single official is dangerous and incongruous.  Such 
concentration is particularly unattractive where, as here, there exist 
no good reasons for the continual individualization of power beyond 
the naïve assumption that each Chief Justice is too ethical to abuse it.  
Federal judicial authority has flourished under a regime of decision 
making that incorporates collectivity and reason giving, and these 
norms should be extended to embrace many of the special powers 
currently held by the Chief Justice alone. 
